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Introduction
The idea of extending first-order logic by means of generalized quantifiers dates back to the work of Mostowski [Mos57] on cardinality quantifiers, which was an attempt to remedy the fact that key notions of modern mathematics, such as the notion of a fi-L. 1.P.N .
URA 1507, UniversitC Paris-Nord 93430 Villetaneuse France ct @lipn.univ-paris13.fr nite set or the notion of an uncountable set, were not first-order definable over the class of all (either finite or infinite) structures. In Mostowski's stride, miscellaneous quantifiers, inspired by probabilistic or topological concepts, came to light. A decade later, Lindstrom
[Lin66] gave a very general definition of a quantifier, allowing practically any class K of structures to be used for defining a new quantifier QK that captures membership in that class. Since then, the study of languages with added quantifiers has been an important line of research of abstract model theory [BF85] .
Meanwhile, finite model theory had emerged as an important research area [Faggo] . The steadily growing interest of logicians in finite structures was a consequence of the strengthened connections between logic and computer science. Researchers rapidly realized that first-order logic (FO) was not tuned properly for this new challenge. In particular, FO lacks any form of recursion mechanism that reveals necessary to define usual properties of finite structures. For the last two decades, a considerable amount of work has been achieved, in the context of finite model theory, on logics whose expressive power surpasses FO's: Gurevich and Shelah [GS86] , among others, investigated and compared various fixed-point extensions of firstorder logic, and Kolaitis and Vardi [IWSOb, KV92bI undertook a careful examination of infinitary languages. Most of the work on extended logics over finite structures was related to important problems of descritive complexity. Very recently, generalized quantifiers have been studied in the realm of finite structures [KV92a, He1921.
The restriction to finite structures also enabled the design and development of specific methods, among which 0/1 laws appear as central. This line of research was initiated by Fagin [Fag761 and Glebski et alii [GKLT69] who independently proved the following startling result: given any FO sentence cp, if all structures of size n are considered equiprobable, then the limit, as n + 00, of the probability that cp is satisfied by a random structure of size n, always exists and is equal to either 0 or 1. Languages enjoying such a property are said to have a 0/1 law. By now, the 0/1 law has been shown to hold for numerous extensions of first-order logic without functions or constants: fixed-point logics [BGK85, KV871, the infinitary logic with a finite number of variables 15",~,
[KVSOb] and some prenex classes of existential secondorder logic [KVgOa] .
Our aim in the present paper is to study the asymptotic behavior of sentences of FO(Q), where Q is a set of generalized quantifiers. We first focus on strongly monotonic quantifiers. A quantifier Q, binding one formula, is strongly monotonic if it is defined by a class IC of structures (A, X), with X c Ak for some integer k, that is preserved under a loose form of extension:
Strong monotonicity is a neat framework for capturing numerous classes of graphs, among which planarity, ncolorability, and so on. We give a simple proof that the 0/1 law holds for the logics FO*(Q) extending (without free variables in the scope of generalized quantifiers) FO by any family of strongly monotonic quantifiers. Hence, we yield a generalization of a criterion of Blass and Harary [BH79] for proving that almost no graphs satisfy some properties.
We then turn to extensions of FO with counting. To our knowledge, the only result on the asymptotic probabilities of extensions of first-order logic with counting can be found in [KnySO] , where it is proved that, for a rational r such that 0 5 r 5 1, if the asymptotic probability of a formula p(z) is different from r , sentences of the form: "there is at least a fraction r of the elements of the domain satisfying cp(z)" have a 0/1 law. The restriction on r is crucial. Indeed, the sentence expressing that "there is at least one half of the elements of the domain satisfying P(z)" , where P is some unary predicate, has asymptotic probability 4. Our results differ from Knyazev's in two respects: (i) we are concerned with families of quantifiers expressing equalities or inequalities of first-order definable relations of arbitrary arities, and (ii) our proofs rely upon radically different-methods, namely the Laplace method and the saddle-point method for computing integrals. It should be noted that neither of our last two theorems can be deduced from Ihyazev's main result.
Counting is an essential primitive in database query languages. Logical languages generally lack the ability to express counting, though it is very easy to count on any computational device [AV91]. 0/1 laws have been used in this context to get upper bounds on the expressive power of query languages. These results give a better understanding of the expressive power gained with counting primitives such as Hartig's and Rescher's quantifiers.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the main definitions. Section 3 is devoted to strongly monotonic quantifiers. In Sections 4 and 5, two theorems are proved, which establish a 0/1 law (respectively a limit-law) for extensions of FO by means of the Hktig quantifiers (respectively the Rescher quantifiers).
Asymptotic Probabilities and Ge:neralized Quantifiers
In this section, we introduce the basic concepts and tools that will be used throughout the paper. The asymptotic probability p(p) of cp is the limit, if it exists, of p,(cp), as n + 00. A property is almost surely (a.s.) true (resp. almost surely false) if Its asymptotic probability is 1 (resp. 0). If the asymptotic probability is defined for every sentence of L[r], L[r] is said to have a limit law. If, in addition, the asymptotic probability is either 0 or 1, L[r] is said to have a (labelled) 0/1 law.
In [Fag76], Fagin proved that there is a r-structure over the set w of all integers, called the mndom coutatable r-structure, which plays a key role in the study of the asymptotic probabilities of FO[r] sentences. In the sequel, O[r] will denote the random countable r-structure. The following well-known property will turn out to be essential to the proofs of Theorems 4.1, 5.1. Obviously, for any set Q of generalized quantifiers, logics FO(Q) can be defined in the same way. In the following sections, we shall disallow the occurrence of free variables in generalized quantifiers and FO' (Q) will denote the sublanguage of FO(Q) obtained by replacing the above formation rule for Q K with the following one.
0 If p1,. . . , 'pk are formulas and, for each i E (1,. . ., k}, 3Fj is a tuple of variables of arity ri and pi has exactly ri free variables, then
Qx: E l , . . . , z k (pl (El), . . . , Vk(5k)) is a formula.
The latter closed formula will be referred to as a generalized atomic sentence.
Strongly Monotonic Quantifiers
In this section, we introduce the notion of a strongly monotonic quantifier and prove that extensions of first-order logic with any family of strongly monotonic quantifiers have a 0/1 law. There are plenty of natural examples of strongly monotonic quantifiers. The most obvious strongly monotonic quantifiers are the first-order existential quantifier 3, and the counting quantifiers 3 i x , meaning "there are at least i distinct x's" [ImmBs] . Consider now the class K , p of non planar graphs. The quantifier &K+ is obviously strongly monotonic; it is known ([Ber76] , p. 21) that a graph is planar if it does not contain a subgraph-in the graph-theoretic sense-homeomorphic either to K 3 , 3 (the bi-partite 3,3-graph) or to Kg (the 5-clique). The notion of ncolombilityprovides us with another example. If L,,c is the class of graphs that are not n-colorable, then &xWmc is a strongly monotonic quantifier. More generally, if a property of graphs has a forbidden subgraph characterization, its complement can be expressed by a strongly monotonic quantifier. It is now folklore in the theory of random graphs that such properties are satisfied by almost no graphs [BH79] : it is an easy consequence of the extension axioms that, for any graph H , almost every graph has an induced subgraph isomorphic to H . Theorem 3.1 below thus includes as subcases the results about the asymptotic probability of planarity, n-colorability, chordality, etc.
Let Qsm be any set of strongly monotonic quantifiers.
Theorem 3.1 FOt(Q,,) has a (labelled) 0/1 law.
Proof : Obviously, the set of a.s. true or a.s. false properties is closed under finite conjunctions and negations. So, since there is no free variable within the scope of generalized quantifiers, it is sufficient to prove that every generalized atomic sentence @ Qx:Z1,. . . ,3Fk(pl(fl), . . . ,pk(Ek)), with a strongly monotonic quantifier Q K , has asymptotic probability 0 or 1. If X: = 0, then @ is always false, and its probability is uniformly 0. Otherwise, let n be such that the probability that a r-structure over n does not belong to L is p (0 _< p < 1). Then, by a simple combinatorial argument and by the strong : monotonicity, the probability that a r-structure over m (with m 2 2n) does not belong to XI is at most p2.
Therefore, the ratio of .r-structures of S~~U C , [ T ] which do not belong to K tends to 0 as n tends to 00, and the asymptotic probability of is 1.
0
The above proof actually gives a more accurate insight into the asymptotic probability than Theorem 3.1. 0 The speed of convergence of the asymptotic probability of a sentence in FO' (Qsm) is exponential.
0 If X: defines a non empty subclass, then the sentence 0 : QnZl,. . .,Zk(pl(Zl),. . . , p k ( % ) ) has asymptotic probability 1.
It follows that the asymptotic probability of planarity and n-colorability of a graph is 0. Strong monotonicity thus gives a broader language for tackling with the problem of the asymptotic probability of important properties of relational structures. 
Hartig Quantifiers

IZ,B((S(Z), $(B))
is identical to the asymptotic behavior of
with I' = I -J and J' = J -I. We set e = N , ( * r ) , 11 = card(I') and e, = card(J'). The equivalent combinatorial problem is the following:
One randomly distributes n balls into 1 equiprobable urns. For each pair (e1 , t 2 ) of integers such that k'l + 12 5 e, let An denote the probability that the number of balls in the first el urns be equal to the number of balls in the next ones. An easy computation yields:
It is immediate that if the limit of An, as n + CO, exists and is equal to either 0 or 1, then FO*(I) has-a labelled 0/1 law. Lemma4.2 thereafter shows that this is indeed the case and gives also accurate informatbn 
0
As an aside, the next proposition shows that the complexity of the decision problem for the asymptotic truth of a sentence of FO'(1) is as "low" as the complexity of the counterpart problem for FO [Gra83] . If free variables can occur within the scope of a Hartig quantifier, the 0/1 law (and even the limit law) fails.
Theorem 4.4
There is a sentence p of FO(1) whose probability pn('p) does not have a limit.
Proof : It is sufficient to show that the property of graphs, expressible in FO(I), that says "there is (at least) one vertex adjacent to exactly the half of the other vertices" does not have an asymptotic probability. Indeed, while the sentence is obviously always false on graphs of even order, its probability does not tend to 0, as n + CO, on graphs of order 2n + 1. To see this last point, we shall rely on a general theorem given in [Bo1851 (Chap. 111, Theorem 1, p. 57), which asserts in particular the following The same technique can be applied to similarity quantifiers S,, of type ( r , P ) , which state that two defined relations are isomorphic, and not only of equal cardinalities (Hartig quantifiers) . The syntax is similar to Hartig quantifiers with S in place of I. The semantics is defined as follows:
$(8)) iff ( A , pA) ( A , $ A ) .
Let S be the set of similarity quantifiers of all types.
We define FO'(S) in the same way as FO'(1) . 
Rescher Quantifiers
We now proceed to the study of a natural extension of FO' (I) including the possibility of testing inequalities of cardinalities of first-order definable relations. One randomly distributes n balls into 1 equiprobable urns. For each pair (Ll,L2) of integers such that 11 +Pz 5 1, let Bn denote the probability that the number of balls in the first urns be lesser than the number of balls in the next 1 2 ones. An easy computa-
Conclusions
We undertook a study of the asymptotic truth of sentences for extensions of FO with generalized quantifiers, and came up with a characterization of the asymptotic behavior of two kinds of languages, corresponding on the one hand to strongly monotonic quantifiers and on the other hand to counting quantifiers. As for FO*(I), the syntactic constraint (no free variables within the scope of Hiirtig quantifiers) we imposed on the formulas revealed essential: our counterexample to the 0/1 law for the full language FO(1) indicates the very place where the boundary of 011 laws is broken in the hierarchy of counting extensions of FO.
In most cases, the 0/1 law no longer holds for FO(Q) where Q is a (set of) generalized quantifier(:i). This is the case for instance of partially ordered quantifiers, such as Henkin quantifiers [HenGl] , which yield the same expressive power as existential second-order logic [BG86]. For example, the following sentence expresses the fact that the cardinality of the domain is even.
Indeed, it states that there exist two unary functions f and g , which are equal and one-one; since the domain is finite, they define a bijection, which is involuti,ve and has no fixpoint.
In the body of the paper, we did not consider 1a:nguages of the form L*(Q), C being a logic stronger Proof: See the Appendix (section A.2).
0
The limit law of Theorem 5.1 can be easily generalized to sentences of FO*(R) with one generalized atomic sub-sentence, or under some technical assumptions to sentences with several generalized atomic subsentences, with dyadic limit law. We coiijecture that in the general case, FO*(R) admits a dyadic limit law. Note that if the existence of the asymptotic probability for all sentences of FO*(R) [T] is established, the finiteness of the set of equivalence classes of 1-tuples over the random countable structure Q [ r ] (Proposition 2.1) will ensure that the set of possible values is finite for each r. Finally, making the change of variable w = e", we get
T O
We suppose that n is even. This restriction is harmless and the case n odd can be dealt with in an analogous way.
Define can thus be rewritten as
It is known that a k can be expressed directly in terms of the Legendre functions of first and second kind, according to the values of the parameters. It is nevertheless here more direct to apply the saddle point method, see e.g. [Ls771, which Produces an MYmP totic expansion for integrals of the form = ll/e, p = t2/e, n = 2k and p = 2u. An i.e. showing again the convergence to 0 at exponential speed. The proof of the lemma is concluded. From Toeplitz lemma, see [Loe77] , it follows that if fp tends to a limit as p -) 00, then Bp will tend to the same limit. It turns out that fp can be expressed in an integral form, allowing to use the saddle-point method, see [LS77] . Introduce the cumulative distribution function of the binomial distribution 
Then fp = B ( [ $ J ; p , r ) .
It is sweet to remark that B ( k ; p , r ) admits the following integral representation, see [Fe170] , Assume p is odd, for instance p = 2u + 1, and set s = 5. Then As in the proof of lemma 4.2, we are in a position to apply the saddle point method to the above integral, which yields three different cases, according to the position of the point t = 1/2 (which is the point where the function logt(1 -t ) reaches its maximum) with respect to s : 
